To show that Graham’s observations are perennially true, we can substitute Microsoft for IBM and Cisco for Texas Instruments. Thirty years apart, the results are uncannily similar: Microsoft’s stock dropped 55.7% from 2000 through 2002, while Cisco’s stock―which had risen roughly 50-fold over the previous six years―lost 76% of its value from 2000 through 2002. As with Texas Instruments, the drop in Cisco’s stock price was sharper than the fall in its earnings, which dropped just 39.2% (comparing the three-year average for 1997–1999 against 2000–2002). As always, the hotter they are, the harder they fall.
The Intelligent Investor – Chapter 5, footnotes

先週と今週で6%ほどドローダウンした私のポートフォリオ。これらの言葉をよく噛みしめないといけません。こんなに露骨な成長株は持ってないけれど。。
PERが高かろうと低かろうと、その銘柄の価格が一気に伸びればそれは成長株なのでしょう。伸びる速度が早ければ下落も早いことが分かります。したがって直近急伸したBS11、エスクリ、毎日コムネットの下げはきつくなって当然。一度売っておくくらいが賢かったかもしれません。

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But there is a second lesson in Graham’s approach. The only thing you can be confident of while forecasting future stock returns is that you will probably turn out to be wrong. The only indisputable truth that the past teaches us is that the future will always surprise us―always!
―The Intelligent Investor, Commentary on Chapter 3

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2000年ITバブル崩壊直前の無責任野郎たちの紹介。

In 1999 and early 2000, bull-market baloney was everywhere:
On December 7, 1999, Kevin Landis, portfolio manager of the Firsthand mutual funds, appeared on CNN’s Moneyline telecast. Asked if wireless telecommunication stocks were overvalued―with many trading at infinite multiples of their earnings―Landis had a ready answer. “It’s not a mania,” he shot back. “Look at the outright growth, the absolute value of the growth. It’s big.”
On January 18, 2000, Robert Froelich, chief investment strategist at the Kemper Funds, declared in the Wall Street Journal: “It’s a new world order. We see people discard all the right companies with all the right people with the right vision because their stock price is too high―that’s the worst mistake an investor can make.”
In the April 10, 2000, issue of BusinessWeek, Jeffrey M. Applegate, then the chief investment strategist at Lehman Brothers, asked rhetorically: “Is the stock market riskier today than two years ago simply because prices are higher? The answer is no.”
But the answer is yes. It always has been. It always will be.
―The Intelligent Investor, Commentary on Chapter 3

yes!
3人目リーマンブラザーズじゃん！！！おいおい。今呼んでいる版が発売されたのは2003年、リーマンショックの前なのだが。。なんという偶然か。

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ジェームズ・P・オショネシーが分析した手法はWhat Work on Wall StreetじゃなくてWhat Used to Work on Wall Streetだ、と論じた後、Foolish Fourというすごく怪しい方法を取り上げて次のように言う。

The Foolish Four, in short, was one of the most cockamamie stock-picking formulas ever concocted. The Fools made the same mistake as O’Shaughnessy: If you look at a large quantity of data long enough, a huge number of patterns will emerge―if only by chance. By random luck alone, the companies that produce above-average stock returns will have plenty of things in common. But unless those factors cause the stocks to outper-forms, they can’t be used to predict future returns.
―The Intelligent Investor, Commentary on Chapter 1

過去のデータから未来を予測するんじゃないよ、との教え。

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On the other hand, investing is a unique kind of casino―one where you cannot lose in the end, so long as you play only by the rules that put the odds squarely in your favor. People who invest make money for themselves; people who speculate make money for their brokers. And that, in turn, is why Wall Street perennially downplays the durable virtues of investing and hypes the gaudy appeal of speculation.
―The Intelligent Investor, Commentary on Chapter 1

私も投機は嫌です。

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アベノミクス:バブル崩壊２５年 「結局、日本人はバブルから何も学んでいない」 – 毎日新聞
私が危惧していたことを裏付けてくれる記事だ。今の状況はどう考えてもバブル。新宿の百貨店には日本人と中国人の金持ちが集まってウホウホしているが一般大衆の生活はどう考えたって悪くなっている。消費増税、年金減額の始まり、密かに上がっている保険料、少しずつ減っていくポテチの一袋あたりの量、若者の40%の貯蓄は0円（うちもない）。http://mainichi.jp/select/news/20150326k0000e040187000c.html こんな記事もある。このバブルはいつか必ず崩壊するが、EUも緩和を始めちゃったし、運が悪ければリーマンショック並の崩壊と低迷になるのではないか。
インタビュイーの野口悠紀雄さんは超・整理法なので有名ですが、Amazonでの本業の経済書の評価は今一つ。私も読んだことはない。しかしこの人は、記事に必ず自分で調べたデータや根拠を載せてくれる。自分流の考えに筋が通っている。私は好きです。
一番気になった言葉を引用します。

−−それでは、バブルにどう向き合えばいいのでしょう？

　人間は賢くなれない。せいぜい他の人が賢くない時に自分はどうやって防衛するか、ということでしょう。

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いきなり全文暗記するべき格言が。。

・A stock is not just a ticker symbol or an electronic blip; it is an ownership interest in an actual business, with an underlying value that does not depend on its share price.
・The market is a pendulum that forever swings between unsustainable optimism (which makes stocks too expensive) and unjustified pessimism (which makes them too cheap). The intelligent investor is a realist who sells to optimists and buys from pessimists.
・The future value of every investment is a function of its present price. The higher the price you pay, the lower your return will be.
・No matter how careful you are, the one risk no investor can ever eliminate is the risk of being wrong. Only by insisting on what Graham called the “margin of safety”―never overpaying, no matter how exciting an investment seems to be―can you minimize your odds of error.
・The secret to your financial success is inside yourself. If you become a critical thinker who takes no Wall Street “fact” on faith, and you invest with patient confidence, you can take steady advantage of even the worst bear markets. By developing your discipline and courage, you can refuse to let other people’s mood swings govern your financial destiny. In the end, how your investments behave is much less important than how you behave.

―A Note About Benjamin Graham by Jason Zweig

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As with buying at the exact perfect moment, it’s nearly impossible to sell at a stock’s peak. They almost always bounce a little bit higher. By pushing your tracking period out to three months, you avoid killing yourself over a small uptick the day after you sell. Such occurrences are up to the whims of the universe and no amount of studying prices will improve your odds of timing it right. That’s why we look at three-month time frames. You’re interested in trends, not flukes.

―Jason Kelly – The Neatest Little Guide to Stock Market Investing
whims of the universe(宇宙の気まぐれ)ってところがいいですよね。

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I’ve probably convinced you of the need to rely on yourself for decisions. Just in case, however, I must reiterate this point. Only you fully understand your goals and tolerance for risk. Nobody cares more about your money than you do. You worked hard for it, you searched the world for companies that meet your requirements, you became an owner of those companies, and you should count on yourself alone for the right time to sell.

―Jason Kelly – The Neatest Little Guide to Stock Market Investing
だれも信用してはならぬ、お前の問題だから

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昭和金融恐慌で高橋是清が危機を処理した44日間（1927年）｜週刊ダイヤモンドで読む 逆引き日本経済史｜ダイヤモンド・オンラインより

1. 好況によって投資が亢進し、潜在成長率を大きく上回って資産価格（株・不動産）が上昇する。
2. 期待成長率（将来のインフレ率と同じ）が大きく上昇する。人々と企業は熱狂の渦中にある。
3. 銀行（その他金融機関を含む）の融資が激増するが、担保資産価格も上昇しているのでどんどん亢進する。銀行も熱狂している。
4. 市場参加者が潜在成長率を超えた部分を、あるきっかけでバブルと認識しはじめると、資産価格は下落を始める。企業も個人の心理も冷却する。
5. 資産価格の上昇率は潜在成長率まで下がるはずだが、日本のようにそれを下回って下落することもある。
6. 銀行は担保資産価格の下落によって債権が不良化する（不良債権）。
7. 期待成長率も低下する。物価も下落。金利も低下。
8. 不良債権を大量に抱え込んだ銀行は自己資本比率を維持するために分母の資産を減らす行動をとり、貸し渋りや貸しはがしを行なう。この経路を通じて倒産が殖え、不況となる。
9. 債務超過に迫る銀行からの預金流出が起きる。パニックになると取り付け騒ぎとなる。

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