In the great bull market of the 1920s relatively little distinction was drawn between industry leaders and other listed issues, provided the latter were of respectable size. The public felt that a middle-sized company was strong enough to weather storms and that it had a better chance for really spectacular expansion than one that was already of major dimensions. The depression years 1931–32, however, had a particularly devastating impact on the companies below the first rank either in size or in inherent stability. As a result of that experience investors have since developed a pronounced preference for industry leaders and a corresponding lack of interest most of the time in the ordinary company of secondary importance. This has meant that the latter group have usually sold at much lower prices in relation to earnings and assets than have the former. It has meant further that in many instances the price has fallen so low as to establish the issue in the bargain class.
―The Intelligent Investor, Chapter 7



 極右はファシズムを支持することが多いが、ファシズムは戦前、国民国家の民主主義の制度に独裁的・権威主義的な権力体制を加味することで、後発の国民国家だったドイツやイタリアなどが国家としての発展を加速するための「ターボエンジン」の機能として発明された。国家体制としてファシズムを採用したドイツやイタリアは、19世紀以来の欧州の覇権国だった英国を追い抜き、英国から覇権を奪うことを画策し、二度の大戦が起きた。 (覇権の起源)
 二度の大戦で、米国の力を借りて(見返りに米国に覇権を譲渡して英国は黒幕になり)独伊や日本を打ち負かした英国は、戦後、二度とファシズムを使って国力を急増させて米英覇権に対抗する国が出てこないよう、ファシズムを「極悪」のものとする国際プロパガンダを定着させた。戦後、米英覇権の傘下に入った欧州のエリート層は、ファシズムを極悪とする価値観を受け入れたが、エリートの外側を出発点とする極右勢力は「ファシズムを信奉して何が悪い」とラディカルに主張し続けている。タブー抜きで自国を強化したいと考えるなら、ファシズムの肯定があり得る選択になる。 (覇権の起源(2)ユダヤ・ネットワーク)
――欧州極右の本質 田中宇


“growth” portfolios describe their holdings as companies with “above-average growth potential” or “favorable prospects for earnings growth.”

A company with an ordinary record cannot, without confusing the term, be called a growth company or a “growth stock” merely because its proponent expects it to do better than the average in the future. It is just a “promising company.” Graham is making a subtle but important point: If the definition of a growth stock is a company that will thrive in the future, then that’s not a definition at all, but wishful thinking. It’s like calling a sports team “the champions” before the season is over. This wishful thinking persists today; among mutual funds, “growth” portfolios describe their holdings as companies with “above-average growth potential” or “favorable prospects for earnings growth.” A better definition might be companies whose net earnings per share have increased by an annual average of at least 15% for at least five years running.(Meeting this definition in the past does not ensure that a company will meet it in the future.)
―The Intelligent Investor, Chapter 7, footnotes



Weighing the evidence objectively, the intelligent investor should conclude that IPO does not stand only for “initial public offering.” More accurately, it is also shorthand for:
It’s Probably Overpriced,
Imaginary Profits Only,
Insiders’ Private Opportunity, or
Idiotic, Preposterous, and Outrageous.
―The Intelligent Investor – Commentary of Chapter 6


A long-term investor is the only kind of investor there is.

The lesson is clear: Don’t just do something, stand there. It’s time for everyone to acknowledge that the term “long-term investor” is redundant. A long-term investor is the only kind of investor there is. Someone who can’t hold on to stocks for more than a few months at a time is doomed to end up not as a victor but as a victim.
―The Intelligent Investor, Commentary of Chapter 6

ちなみにlong-term investorの定義は、ここでは who traded a minuscule 0.2% of their total holdings in an average month, と持株の0.2%しか動かさない人のこと。年2.4%ってそこまで長期で持てるか。。?


One fairly dependable sign of the approaching end of a bull swing is the fact that new common stocks of small and nondescript companies are offered at prices somewhat higher than the current level for many medium-sized companies with a long market history. (It should be added that very little of this common-stock financing is ordinarily done by banking houses of prime size and reputation.)
―The Intelligent Investor, Chapter 6



In the two years from June 1960, through May 1962, more than 850 companies sold their stock to the public for the first time―an average of more than one per day. In late 1967 the IPO market heated up again; in 1969 an astonishing 781 new stocks were born. That oversupply helped create the bear markets of 1969 and 1973–1974. In 1974 the IPO market was so dead that only nine new stocks were created all year; 1975 saw only 14 stocks born. That undersupply, in turn, helped feed the bull market of the 1980s, whenroughly 4,000 new stocks flooded the market―helping to trigger the over-enthusiasm that led to the 1987 crash. Then the cycle swung the other way again as IPOs dried up in 1988–1990. That shortage contributed to the bull market of the 1990s―and, right on cue, Wall Street got back into the business of creating new stocks, cranking out nearly 5,000 IPOs. Then, after the bubble burst in 2000, only 88 IPOs were issued in 2001―the lowest annual total since 1979. In every case, the public has gotten burned on IPOs, has stayed away for at least two years, but has always returned for another scalding. For as long as stock markets have existed, investors have gone through this manic-depressive cycle.
―The Intelligent Investor, Chapter 6, footnote

1960-1962にIPOブーム、850社。1969年に再び大ブームで781社→供給過剰で1969, 1973-1974年に大不況

becoming more familiar with a subject does not significantly reduce people’s tendency to exaggerate how much they actually know about it.

Psychologists led by Baruch Fischhoff of Carnegie Mellon University have documented a disturbing fact: becoming more familiar with a subject does not significantly reduce people’s tendency to exaggerate how much they actually know about it. That’s why “investing in what you know” can be so dangerous; the more you know going in, the less likely you are to probe a stock for weaknesses. This pernicious form of overconfidence is called “home bias,” or the habit of sticking to what is already familiar:
In short, familiarity breeds complacency. On the TV news, isn’t it always the neighbor or the best friend or the parent of the criminal who says in a shocked voice, “He was such a nice guy”? That’s because whenever we are too close to someone or something, we take our beliefs for granted, instead of questioning them as we do when we confront something more remote. The more familiar a stock is, the more likely it is to turn a defensive investor into a lazy one who thinks there’s no need to do any homework. Don’t let that happen to you.
―The Intelligent Investor, Commentary of Chapter 5

持っている物を高く評価してしまう効果:endowment effectに加えて、よく知っている物事を高く評価してしまう効果:home biasが登場した。良く知っていることはむしろ盲目につながる。気を付けないといけない。ともに人間の虚栄をよく突いている概念だな。


The average doctor may be more likely than the average widow to elect to become an enterprising investor, and he is perhaps more likely to succeed in the undertaking. He has one important handicap, however―the fact that he has less time available to give to his investment education and to the administration of his funds. In fact, medical men have been notoriously unsuccessful in their security dealings. The reason for this is that they usually have an ample confidence in their own intelligence and a strong desire to make a good return on their money, without the realization that to do so successfully requires both considerable attention to the matter and something of a professional approach to security values.
―The Intelligent Investor, Chapter 5